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“THUS IN THE BEGINNING ALL THE WORLD WAS 
AMERICA”:1 THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-PROTEST 
LEGISLATION AND AN AMERICAN CONQUEST CULTURE 





The United States remains the global leader for energy and raw materials 
pipeline networks, maintaining over 2.6 million miles of liquid, gas 
transmission, and gas distribution pipelines.
2
 Though economically 
lucrative, the industry is not without controversy. Since time immemorial, 
the energy sector has received harsh criticism for the environmental impact 
of these pipeline networks and their proximity to communities and homes 
in the United States. More recently, however, protests have erupted against 
pipeline construction causing the desecration of numerous tribal religious 
and sacred sites. Construction resulting in such defilement has caused 
national opposition to the energy industry’s actions and support for the 
affected Native American tribes. 
In response to these protests, the United States and numerous state 
governments have introduced legislation criminalizing damage to, and even 
merely an attempt or intent to interfere with, pipeline construction and 
operation. Most recently, Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed the Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act into law in June 2019.
3
 The Act charges a 
felony against an individual who damages property or interferes with the 
operations of critical infrastructure such as pipelines, dams, and 
petrochemical plants.
4
 Proponents of the Texas Act cite instances of arson 
and gun violence at pipeline facilities to show the alleged need for this law.
5
 
                                                                                                             
 1. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. II, ch. 5, § 49 (1690), 
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch16s3.html. 
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 2. General Pipeline FAQs, DEP’T OF TRANSP.: PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 
SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/faqs/general-pipeline-faqs (last visited Nov. 19, 
2019). 
 3. See H.B. 3557, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019). 
 4. See id. § 2. 
 5. Audiovisual: Testimony of Al Philippus, Public Hearing on H.B. 3557 Before the 
Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence Comm., Tex. H.R. 86th Leg. Sess. (Mar. 25, 2019) (on file 
with author). 
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Additionally, a new U.S. Department of Transportation proposal seeks to 
broaden the type of energy projects protected, as well as the activities 
subject to criminal prosecution, under existing federal law.
6
 On the surface, 
such legislation seems to protect energy and raw materials infrastructure, 
but a closer look into the legislative history reveals the laws’ blatant 
objective of preventing pipeline justice movements from challenging 
energy use and facility construction.  
The growing body of pro-pipeline legislation acts as a fear tactic against 
groups with grievances similar to those of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian 
Reservation.
7
 The Standing Rock Reservation is home to the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe, which has actively opposed the Dakota Access Pipeline’s 
construction from its proposal in 2014 until its halted development in 
September 2016.
8
 The Tribe opposed the project because of the 
government’s disregard for the pipeline’s proposed route; though the line 
would travel underground through public land one-half of a mile from the 
reservation’s border, it would cross through the Tribe’s water source and a 
variety of its sacred sites.
9
 While the Standing Rock Tribe does not have 
legal title to the land, the sites along the pipeline’s path of construction 
contain sacramental burial grounds and other areas of religious and cultural 
significance.
10
 Surrounding the reservation, protests erupted as a result of 
the United States’ disrespect for these sites,
11
 which ultimately gave rise to 
North Dakota initiating litigation against the federal government for its 
failure to contain the protests and the participants’ presence on federal, 
state, and private property.
12
 
State legislation introduced after the Standing Rock protests targeted 
tribal communities and discouraged them from exercising their rights under 
the First Amendment and American property law. But the United States’ 
acquiescence to actions that “legitimize[] the conquest and colonization of 
                                                                                                             
 6. Keith Goldberg, DOT Plan Would Lower Criminal Boom on Pipeline Protests, 
LAW360 (June 3, 2019, 4:21 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1165206/dot-plan-
would-lower-criminal-boom-on-pipeline-protests. 
 7. Naveena Sadasivam, Mess with a Texas Pipeline Now and You Could End Up a 
Felon, GRIST MAG. (June 17, 2019), https://grist.org/article/mess-with-a-texas-pipeline-now-
and-you-could-end-up-a-felon [hereinafter Sadasivam, Texas Pipeline]. 
 8. History, STAND WITH STANDING ROCK, https://standwithstandingrock.net/history/ 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2019) [hereinafter Standing Rock History]. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Complaint at 1, North Dakota v. United States, No. 1:19-cv-00150-DLH-CRH 
(D.N.D. July 18, 2019). 
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Native lands” dates back to the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. 
M’Intosh.
13
 Applying the discovery doctrine,
14
 the Johnson Court 
“redefined indigenous lands as an object to be conquered and exploited” 
rather than preserved and protected.
15
 Johnson created a judicial framework 
that overrides tribal property rights and discourages tribal opposition to the 
taking of tribal land. Though a site on federal land may have historical and 
cultural value to a tribe, numerous courts will not afford the site protection 
under the First Amendment’s speech, assembly, and exercise of religion 
provisions unless the land is sufficiently central to the tribe’s religion.
16
 
Further, government activities that destroy parts of tribal religion, such as 
building roads through tribal ceremonial sites, are permissible so long as 




Historically, Indian nations have been unsuccessful in defending against 
government action absent a showing of fee simple title to the land holding 
their sacred sites. Lack of precedent in favor of native peoples, as well as 
the American conquest culture created in Johnson, has led to an emerging 
body of state and federal anti-protest legislation. The broad language of 
anti-protest laws may seem to apply universally; in reality, the laws serve as 
a strong message to individuals to stay quiet amidst intrusion on sacred, 
culturally significant land. The Standing Rock crisis poses a unique and 
unprecedented opportunity to combat the Johnson framework.
18
 Without 
strong advocacy against this legislation, tribal acquiescence to government 
actions may become the new norm.  
This Comment serves a dual purpose. First, this analysis is a message to 
tribal communities that they are entitled—and encouraged by many 
                                                                                                             
 13. Mary Kathryn Nagle, Environmental Justice and Tribal Sovereignty: Lessons from 
Standing Rock, 127 YALE L.J. FORUM 667, 669 (2018); see also Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 14. The Doctrine of Discovery follows that European or Christian nations that discover 
new lands gain governmental and property rights to the land in spite of existing native 
ownership, occupation, and use of the land. This Doctrine entitles unilateral transfer of 
native rights over the land to the European or Christian discoverer absent tribal consent. See 
Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543. 
 15. Nagle, supra note 13, at 669. 
 16. See Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980); see also 
Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 17. See Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: 
Asserting a Place for Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1081–82 (2005). 
 18. See Nagle, supra note 13, at 676–78. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
292 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
Americans—to continue their fight against the wrongdoings of federal and 
state governments. This entitlement is supported by the First Amendment 
and theories of property law that afford non-owner rights to the use of 
federal land. Second, this Comment discusses current constitutional 
violations by state governments and warns scholars and lawmakers alike of 
the effects of an American culture of conquest and discrimination created 
by anti-protest legislation.  
Part I broadly introduces the Standing Rock crisis and the plight imposed 
by emerging anti-protest legislation. Part II illustrates the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe movement and litigation resulting from the protests. Part III of 
this analysis focuses on legislation that successfully silences the voices of 
Americans and Native American communities opposing unjust pipeline 
construction. In Part IV, this text discusses the free speech, assembly, and 
exercise of religion provisions of the First Amendment in relation to pro-
pipeline legislation and past tribal claims against the government. Part V 
introduces property law precedent in the sacred site context and discusses 
the differences between Western and native property ideals, concluding that 
a realistic view of American property law affords tribes non-owner rights to 
the use of their sacred lands. In Part VI, this analysis concludes by 
summarizing the rights of tribes opposed to the government actions 
preventing them from protesting and fighting for their sacred sites. 
II. The Standing Rock Protests and Subsequent Litigation 
Controversy within the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe began when the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers chose Energy Transfer Partners to begin 
construction on the Dakota Access Pipeline.
19
 The Army Corps considered 
two pipeline routes: the first, a northern route surrounding the city of 
Bismarck, North Dakota; and the second, a southern route nearing the 
border of the Sioux Territory and crossing through various sites of cultural 
significance to the Tribe.
20
 Both proposed routes crossed under the Missouri 
River, but the route closer to the Sioux Reservation passed under Lake 
Oahe, the Standing Rock Tribe’s primary source of drinking water.
21
 The 
Army Corps ultimately chose the second, southernmost route because of 
                                                                                                             
 19. Treaties Still Matter: The Dakota Access Pipeline, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF 
THE AM. INDIAN, https://americanindian.si.edu/nk360/plains-treaties/dapl (last visited Sept. 
23, 2019). 
 20. Standing Rock History, supra note 8; see also Treaties Still Matter: The Dakota 
Access Pipeline, supra note 19. 
 21. Treaties Still Matter: The Dakota Access Pipeline, supra note 19. 
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The chosen route shields Bismarck residents from danger and passes the 
risk of contaminated water to the Standing Rock Tribe. Pipeline officials 
assured the Tribe that extraordinary measures were being taken to safeguard 
against disaster.
23
 But the pipeline’s opponents note that even the safest 
pipelines could leak, and that a small spill would threaten, and could 
permanently damage, the water supply of nearly 10,000 tribal members.
24
 
The environmental assessments used to choose the route failed to consider 
that taking the pipeline under Lake Oahe would compromise the integrity of 
the Tribe’s water.
25
 In fact, the Army Corps’ assessment seemed to ignore 
the Tribe’s existence entirely, leaving native communities off of maps and 
environmental analyses.
26
 This omission especially frustrated the Tribe 
given Congress’ express delegation to Native American communities to 




The Keystone 1 Pipeline in North Dakota provides an excellent and 
recent example of the environmental dangers associated with oil pipelines. 
In late October 2019, the Keystone 1 Pipeline spilled an estimated 9120 
barrels, or 383,000 gallons, of oil.
28
 Releasing enough liquid to fill more 
than half of an Olympic-size swimming pool, the spill affected surrounding 
wetlands and attracted the concern of the state’s water quality officials.
29
 
Months later, emergency response teams are still working to recover the 
spilled oil and prevent migration to drinking water sources.
30
 The Keystone 
1 leak is precisely what the Army Corps prevented in Bismarck by deciding 
                                                                                                             
 22. Standing Rock History, supra note 8. 
 23. Justin Worland, What to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, TIME 
(Oct. 28, 2016), https://time.com/4548566/dakota-access-pipeline-standing-rock-sioux/. 
 24. Id. (“The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) has 
reported more than 3,300 incidents of leaks and ruptures at oil and gas pipelines since 
2010.”). 
 25. Standing Rock History, supra note 8. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Revised Interpretation of the Clean Water Act Tribal Provision, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/wqs-tech/revised-interpretation-clean-water-act-tribal-provision (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2019); Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 518, 33 U.S.C. § 1377 (2018). 
 28. Phil Helsel, Leak in Keystone Pipeline Spills 9,000 Barrels of Oil in North Dakota, 
NBC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2019, 12:10 AM), https://nbcnews.com/news/us-news/leak-keystone-
pipeline-spills-9-000-barrels-oil-north-dakota-n1074991. 
 29. Id.  
 30. Id. 
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against the northern route for the Dakota Access Pipeline. Instead, the 
Army Corps passed this risk onto the Sioux Tribe, seemingly ignoring the 
health, safety, and water quality risks posed to individuals on the 
reservation. One barrel of crude oil yields forty-two gallons,
31
 but a spill of 
just one gallon of oil can contaminate one million gallons of drinking 
water.
32
 Even the slightest spill in Lake Oahe will compromise the Standing 
Rock Tribe’s drinking water source—possibly permanently. 
Aside from the water contamination risks, the Standing Rock Sioux 
Tribe further opposes the Dakota Access Pipeline’s construction because it 
impedes on sacred burial grounds and other sites of religious and cultural 
significance.
33
 This issue introduces unique problems involving the 
property rights of the Tribe and its ability to oppose the project; though the 
pipeline will not cross the Tribe’s boundary, it nears the border of the 
Tribe’s reservation and crosses under its primary source of drinking water.
34
 
In accordance with federal law, the government is required to consult with 
tribes before engaging in any archeological or environmental excavations 
that may result in the loss of tribal artifacts.
35
 Especially considering the 
potential for destruction of significant cultural artifacts and sites, Standing 
Rock tribal leaders argue they are entitled to oppose the construction 
because the government failed to engage in meaningful consultation with 
them throughout the permitting process.
36
  
The Sioux Tribe organized protests, runs, marches, and horseback rides 
to generate support for its opposition to the pipeline.
37
 The movement 
attracted the attention and support of thousands of Americans across the 
country, including celebrities and notable military veteran groups.
38
 
                                                                                                             
 31. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs): How Many Gallons of Gasoline and Diesel 
Fuel Are Made from One Barrel of Oil?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/ 
tools/faqs/faq.php?id=327&t=9 (last updated May 23, 2018). 
 32. Can Aboveground Storage Tanks Contaminate My Drinking Water?, MINN. RURAL 
WATER ASS’N, https://www.mrwa.com/SWP/Brochures/WebAbovegroundStorageTanktri 
foldBr.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2020). 
 33. Standing Rock History, supra note 8. 
 34. Worland, supra note 23. 
 35. 54 U.S.C. §§ 302705, 306108 (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (2018). 
 36. Worland, supra note 23. 
 37. Treaties Still Matter: The Dakota Access Pipeline, supra note 19. 
 38. Worland, supra note 23; see also Hollywood A-Listers Join Protests Against 
Controversial Dakota Access Pipeline, FOX NEWS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.foxnews. 
com/entertainment/hollywood-a-listers-join-protests-against-controversial-dakota-access-
pipeline (“A growing number of celebrities are joining the fight against construction of the 
Dakota Access oil pipeline on tribal land – including actress Shailene Woodley, who faces 
trial after her arrest during the protests.”); Leonardo DiCaprio (@LeoDiCaprio), TWITTER 
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National support for the cause is particularly moving to indigenous peoples 
who “have been beaten down for so many years that [they] have forgotten 
how strong [they] are.”
39
 For Standing Rock Tribe members, non-members 
joining to defend against the pipeline was a highly spiritual and 
empowering moment.
40
 Defending the cause was so empowering, in fact, 
that thousands of protesters committed to camping at the sites for months 
despite worsening winter conditions.
41
 The sprawling encampments grew so 
large that their combined population would have comprised the tenth largest 
city in North Dakota.
42
 But as the winter weather worsened, so worsened 
the conditions at the protest camps. 
Unbeknownst to the protesters, the camps occupied federal, state, and 
private land, and their actions constituted unlawful trespass.
43
 In its lawsuit 
against the United States, North Dakota alleges that campers erected 
“unsafe structures and unsanitary waste systems,” leaving behind “a spoiled 
environment and a vast quantity of noxious waste, garbage, and debris.”
44
 
The United States, as the facilitator of the project, assumed a duty to 
maintain all pipeline happenings, but North Dakota was forced to step in 
following “frequent outbreaks of illegal, dangerous, unsanitary, and life-
threatening” activities at the encampments, such as blocking highways and 
threatening pipeline employees.
45
 Local law enforcement officers deployed 
weapons such as tear gas, pepper spray, tasers, and rubber bullets to contain 
the protesters.
46
 Despite the sub-twenty degree temperatures, officers 
                                                                                                             
(May 9, 2016, 8:24 PM), https://twitter.com/LeoDiCaprio/status/729844614237147136 
(“Standing w/ the Great Sioux Nation to protect their water & lands. Take a stand: 
change.org/rezpectourwater #RezpectOurWater #KeepItInTheGround”); Daniel A. Medina, 
Standing Rock Protest: Veterans Pledge to Protect Protesters, NBC NEWS, https://www. 
nbcnews.com/storyline/dakota-pipeline-protests/brutal-winter-conditions-deepen-pipeline-
protesters-resolve-n690791 (last updated Dec. 2, 2016, 2:43 PM) (“Groups of U.S. military 
veterans are descending on the Standing Rock oil pipeline protest, vowing to act as ‘human 
shields’ against possible clashes between demonstrators and law enforcement.”). 
 39. Heather Stringer, The Aftermath of Standing Rock, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Feb. 
2018, at 50, https://www.apa.org/monitor/2018/02/cover-standing-rock. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Medina, supra note 38 (“More than 2,000 people have arrived this week despite a 
blizzard that left more than a foot of snow on the ground.”). 
 42. Complaint, supra note 12, at 3. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 4. 
 45. Id. at 2. 
 46. Julia Carrie Wong, Standing Rock Protest: Hundreds Clash with Police over Dakota 
Access Pipeline, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2016, 12:08 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
296 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
attacked protesters with water cannons for lighting fires to keep warm.
47
 
Attendees described the camps as militarized zones;
48
 the National Guard 
set up checkpoints outside the camps and employed helicopters and high-
intensity spotlights to keep watch over the areas at night.
49
 This constant 
surveillance traumatized participants, with some reporting symptoms of 
paranoia following their experience at the camps.
50
 More than 700 
protesters were arrested for expressing their opposition to the pipeline.
51
 
Over ninety-three percent of arrested individuals traveled from outside 
North Dakota to show their support for the Tribe.
52
  
During the protests, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Advisory 
Council on Historic Preservation, and the Department of the Interior 
submitted letters of concern to the Army Corps.
53
 With no response from 
the Army Corps, the Tribe filed suit to reverse the pipeline’s approval.
54
 
The Tribe’s Complaint cited the Fort Laramie Treaty as support.
55
 The 
Treaty affords the Sioux Nation “absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation” of its land, stating that no unauthorized individual is permitted 
to “enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of duties enjoined by 
law . . . [nor] pass over, settle upon, or reside in the territory.”
56
 Supporting 
the status of Sioux Tribes as sovereign nations, the Treaty affords great 
power to these tribes to exclude non-Indians at their discretion.
57
 The 
Supreme Court demonstrated its support for the Fort Laramie Treaty in 
South Dakota v. Bourland, a case in which the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe 
sought to enforce its unqualified right of use and occupation against non-
Indian fishing and hunting on its land.
58
 The Bourland Court upheld the 
                                                                                                             
news/2016/nov/21/standing-rock-protest-hundreds-clash-with-police-over-dakota-access-
pipeline.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Stringer, supra note 39. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Complaint, supra note 12, at 4. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Standing Rock History, supra note 8.  
 54. See Complaint, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
No. 1:16-cv-01534 (D.D.C. July 27, 2016); See also Standing Rock History, supra note 8.  
 55. Treaties Still Matter: The Dakota Access Pipeline, supra note 19. 
 56. Transcript of Treaty of Fort Laramie (1868), OUR DOCUMENTS INITIATIVE, https:// 
www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=42&page=transcript (last visited Sept. 
23, 2019). 
 57. See Treaty Between the United States of America and Different Tribes of Sioux 
Indians, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1868, 15 Stat. 635, 1868 WL 24284. 
 58. See 508 U.S. 679 (1993).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss2/4
No. 2] COMMENTS 297 
 
 
Treaty and insisted that any future reading of it be interpreted liberally in 
favor of Native American tribes.
59
 The Standing Rock Tribe’s use of this 
treaty to support its claims presents an interesting issue considering the 
Tribe does not have legal title to the land in dispute. But the Bourland 
Court’s liberal interpretation of the Fort Laramie Treaty suggests a potential 
non-owner right of the Standing Rock Tribe to control and use the federal 
land housing its sacred sites.  
The Tribe’s Complaint additionally alleges that the Army Corps violated 
numerous federal statutes, including the Clean Water Act, the National 
Historic Preservation Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act.
60
 
Pipeline officials opposed this allegation, claiming full compliance “with all 
federal environmental laws.”
61
 Energy Transfer Partners, the firm 
commissioned to construct the Dakota Access Pipeline, asserted that after 
“extensive searching and investigation in, on, and around the path of the 
proposed pipeline,” it found “not a shred of evidence” suggesting that the 
construction “harmed or threatened a historic resource.”
62
 Just one week 
after these statements, the Tribe’s former Historic Preservation Officer, Tim 
Mentz, received a phone call from an individual “concerned about the 
potential destruction of culturally important sites.”
63
 This individual owned 
a significant portion of land within the pipeline’s construction path, just one 
mile north of the Standing Rock Reservation.
64
 Mentz surveyed the 
individual’s land, describing his visit as follows:  
We immediately observed a number of stone features in the 
pipeline route plainly visible from the edge of the corridor. I am 
very confident that this site, located within the center of the 
corridor, includes burials because the site contained rock cairns 
which are commonly used to mark burials. Two cairns were 
plainly visible and a possible third one existed above the cut 




                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 687. 
 60. See Complaint, supra note 54; see also Standing Rock History, supra note 8. 
 61. Nagle, supra note 13, at 680. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 679. 
 64. Id. at 678–79. 
 65. Id. at 679 (emphasis added). 
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Mentz later returned to the land with a team to conduct a full cultural 
survey.
66
 Along the path of the construction, the team found eighty-two 
stone features and archeological sites and at least twenty-seven burial 
sites.
67
 Mentz described the survey as “one of the most significant 
archeological finds in North Dakota in many years.”
68
 Mentz quickly filed a 
supplemental declaration notifying the district court of his findings.
69
  
Pipeline officials moved quickly to cover up their lack of compliance 
with federal environmental laws.
70
 Less than twenty-four hours after Mentz 
filed the declaration, the pipeline employees relocated their equipment to 
the land identified in the declaration—more than twenty miles away from 
the site they were currently working on—to commence construction.
71
 The 
workers began bulldozing “directly on top of the sacred sites and burial 
grounds identified” in the Mentz’s Declaration.
72
 A group of individuals 
approached the workers, asking them to stop desecrating the sites with their 
equipment.
73
 Though the group’s request was peaceful, the pipeline 
employees unleashed attack dogs on the individuals, resulting in 
bloodshed.
74
 The sudden relocation of the construction was suspicious, 
especially considering the distance traveled. These actions indicate a 
knowing and intentional destruction of sites which the United States is not 
authorized to impose upon.
75
 To date, none of the pipeline’s officials or 




Soon thereafter, the Tribe’s motion for a preliminary injunction was 
denied.
77
 The Department of Justice, Department of the Army, and 
Department of the Interior quickly ordered a stop to pipeline construction in 
the Lake Oahe area, calling for “national reform to ‘ensure meaningful 
tribal input’ on infrastructure projects.”
78
 Construction on the area 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 680. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. at 680–81. 
 74. See id. at 681. 
 75. 54 U.S.C. §§ 302705, 306108 (2018); 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (2018). 
 76. See Nagle, supra note 13, at 681. 
 77. See Memorandum Opinion, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. United States Army 
Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2016). 
 78. Standing Rock History, supra note 8. 
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The State of North Dakota filed suit against the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers in July 2019—nearly three years after construction was halted.
80
 
The State complains, to the tune of $38 million, that the United States’ 
failure to maintain the Standing Rock protests and encampments forced 
local law enforcement to employ “a sustained, large-scale public safety 
response to protect public safety and health.”
81
 The safety response refers to 
the numerous weapons employed throughout the course of the protests, 
such as tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannons.
82
 The State additionally 
seeks compensation under the Federal Tort Claims Act for providing 
“thousands of days of law enforcement and first responder time” to contain 
the protests.
83
 The tortious conduct alleged includes both the Army Corps’ 
failure to govern “private access to and conduct on the federal lands” as 
well as the abandonment of its assumed legal duty to protect protesters and 
the general public from “unlawful and dangerous protest activity.”
84
 
Between providing first responders, cleaning camp sites, and repairing 
damaged infrastructure, the county spent close to $40 million on the 
protests.
85
 However, the State of North Dakota, rather than the county, is 
suing the Army Corps.
86
 The county’s emergency fund only amounted to 





                                                                                                             
 79. Id. 
 80. Complaint, supra note 12, at 1. 
 81. ND Files Suit to Recover Costs Related to DAPL Pipeline Protests, WAYNE 
STENEHJEM: N.D. ATT’Y GEN. (July 18, 2019), https://attorneygeneral.nd.gov/news/nd-files-
suit-recover-costs-related-dapl-pipeline-protests. 
 82. Wong, supra note 46. 
 83. ND Files Suit to Recover Costs Related to DAPL Pipeline Protests, supra note 81. 
 84. Complaint, supra note 12, at 2. 
 85. Jeff Brady, 2 Years After Standing Rock Protests, Tensions Remain but Oil Business 
Booms, NPR (Nov. 29, 2018, 7:20 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/11/29/671701019/2-
years-after-standing-rock-protests-north-dakota-oil-business-is-booming. 
 86. See Complaint, supra note 12, at 1. 
 87. Brady, supra note 85. 
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III. Legislation Targeting Pipeline Protests  
Large oil and gas companies are successfully encouraging anti-protest 
legislation at the state level.
88
 In 2019, firms such as Koch Industries, 
Marathon Petroleum, and Energy Transfer Partners—the company behind 
the Dakota Access Pipeline—entered into a lobbying campaign to 
“effectively outlaw demonstrations near pipelines, chemical plants and 
other infrastructure.”
89
 Onlookers describe these firms’ political push as an 
“orchestrated [and] unholy alliance of oil, gas, chemical, and electric utility 
companies to crush resistance to polluting industries.”
90
 Instead of 
identifying a clear answer as to who should pay for protest damages, big oil 
is politicking to end anti-energy demonstrations altogether. Just this year, 
the state legislatures of Indiana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
and Texas passed critical infrastructure trespassing laws at the 
encouragement of these corporations.
91
 To illustrate, Texas’ new law 
introduces harsh criminal penalties for damaging, interrupting, or intending 
to damage or interrupt the operations of a critical infrastructure facility,
92
 
while South Dakota’s new law criminalizes mere riot “boosting”—a term 
not specifically defined by the state’s legislature.
93
 The intentions of these 
five state legislatures are clear: by furthering the interests of massive oil and 
gas companies, the states are endorsing free speech suppression to benefit 
the energy industry in the purported name of pipeline safety. 
Similarities among these five states point to the legislatures’ likely 
intentions. Indiana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Texas are 
all currently experiencing, and have historically experienced, what is called 
a “Republican trifecta.”
94
 A Republican trifecta occurs when the 
Republican party holds the governorship, the majority in the Senate, and the 
majority in the House.
95
 Though facially apolitical, the energy protection 
legislation comes in the wake of heightened Republican support for the oil 
and gas industry. Only a few months after taking office, President Trump 
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reversed the Obama administration’s denial of a key permit for the Dakota 
Access Pipeline and approved construction moving forward.
96
 Additionally, 
all five states have a vested economic interest in maintaining oil and gas 
operations in their respective jurisdictions. As of July 2017, the natural gas 
and oil industries in Indiana and Tennessee added nearly $14.9 billion and 
$10.6 billion, respectively, to the states’ economies.
97
 Even in times of an 
oil and gas downturn in Texas, experts still consider the energy industry to 
be the backbone of the state’s economy.
98
 Similarly, pipelines are 
considered a “critical energy lifeline in South Dakota,” fueling natural gas 
to thousands of homes and businesses in the state.
99
 Finally, the oil and gas 
industry in North Dakota generated tens of billions of dollars for the state’s 
economy in addition to creating over 72,000 statewide jobs in 2015.
100
 This 
was considered a down year for North Dakota.
101
  
It is difficult to identify a government commitment to protect the 
interests of those opposed to pipelines considering the political and 
economic influences at stake. Energy companies portray lobbying as a 
“necessary counter to the increasingly aggressive tactics of activists” seen 
in the Standing Rock protests.
102
 These firms maintain that their advocacy 
is not aimed at chilling First Amendment rights; rather, energy corporations 
allege that their actions intend to protect public safety and preserve public 
and private property.
103
 The First Amendment, these companies argue, does 
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The firms fail to acknowledge that individuals opposed to pro-pipeline 
legislation are not asking for destructive conduct to receive constitutional 
protection. Rather, protesters seek clarity in legislative language and intent; 
these states should take care to specifically define the conduct prohibited. 
For instance, South Dakota’s riot boosting law does not even demand that 
an individual destroy property or create a public hazard to be charged with 
a felony.
105
 The law’s ambiguous “boosting” term criminalizes mere 
encouragement of political opposition, regardless of the individual’s 
proximity to the protest.
106
 Nor does the Texas law require more than mere 
intent to interrupt facility operations.
107
 Pipeline opponents do not wish to 
destroy critical infrastructure facilities and put themselves in harm’s way. 
Alternatively, they seek legislative language that does not afford states the 
authority to subjectively determine an individual’s intent or degree of 
protest encouragement. 
These laws provide no avenue for alternate modes of protest, leaving 
advocates frustrated and with very little room to voice their opinions. 
Critics further regard the laws as unconstitutional for targeting Native 
American groups with grievances similar to those of the Standing Rock 
Sioux Tribe.
108
 While the language is seemingly unbiased and universally 
applicable, the conversations surrounding the laws suggest otherwise.
109
 
Between the muzzling of free speech and an American history of 
discrimination against Native Americans,
110
 one may be left wondering if 
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the protesters are to blame for resorting to destructive behavior to make 
their point. 
A. South Dakota Laws Under Scrutiny  
Three South Dakota laws are under ACLU attack for targeting “full-
throated advocacy and protest.”
111
 The laws are targeted at Keystone XL 
Pipeline protesters who took issue with the government’s failure to consult 
with tribes before threatening their surrounding environment.
112
 The ACLU 
asserts that the laws target and chill protected speech, “failing to adequately 
describe what speech or conduct could subject protesters and organizations 
to criminal and civil penalties.”
113
  
The first two criminal laws under fire charge individuals with varying 
classes of felonies.
114
 Section 22-10-6 of the South Dakota Codified Laws 
charges any riot participant who “directs, advises, encourages, or solicits” 
others participating in a riot “to acts of force or violence” with a Class 2 
felony.
115
 Section 22-10-6.1 charges an individual who directs or 
encourages riot participants to acts of force or violence with a Class 5 
felony regardless of his participation in the riot.
116
 The State defines “riot” 
as “[a]ny use of force or violence or any threat to use force or violence, if 
accompanied by immediate power of execution, by three or more persons, 
acting together and without authority of law.”
117
 Without defining what it 
means to direct, advise, encourage, or solicit a riot, South Dakota grants 
itself the authority to arbitrarily determine what actions fall under this 
statute.
118
 The laws further criminalize participation in a riot that later 
results in violence regardless of an original intention to keep the protests 
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calm. Therefore, one may be charged with a felony under these laws for 
supporting a peaceful assembly that later turns violent, whether that 
individual was present for the violence or not. These statutes entitle the 
State to subjectively determine the intent of a participant or non-participant, 
as well the likelihood that a non-participant’s speech will incite chaos or 
riot.  
The third law, South Dakota’s new Riot Boosting Act, covers actions 
similar to these two codified laws.
119
 The Act adds that any defendant found 
soliciting or compensating “any other person to commit an unlawful act or 
to be arrested” is subject to treble damages—fees comprised of three times 
the sum of the detriment caused by the actions.
120
 Similar to the preexisting 
criminal laws, this Act holds that an individual does not have to be found 
participating in a protest or engaging in any unlawful activity to be 
convicted.
121
 The language of the Act is vague, as it fails to define what it 
means to engage in riot “boosting” in the first place. Does a restaurant 
owner encourage a riot by serving food to paying customers which happen 
to be participating in the protest? In the age of social media, does an 
individual boost a riot by distributing protest information via sharing, 
liking, or retweeting? Is an attorney liable for advising a past, present, or 
future protester regarding his or her participation in the assembly?  
Even more damning is the Riot Boosting Act’s creation of a riot boosting 
recovery fund.
122
 The fund is designed to “pay any claim for damages 
arising out of or in connection with a riot” with the damages paid by 
violators of the Act.
123
 The State then profits, as the treble damages 
requirement demands payment of “three times a sum that would 
compensate for the detriment caused.”
124
 Given the first third of paid 
damages compensates for protest damages, this structure does not account 
for the remaining two-thirds of paid damages. The recovery fund provision 
incentivizes the State to sue any and all protesters and riot solicitors.
125
 
With arbitrary language and an opportunity for high payout to the state, a 
greater number of prosecutions is likely to result from an act as such. 
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Per the ACLU’s request, the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction halting the State’s use of the three laws in question.
126
 South 
Dakota was barred from applying these laws because they exposed future 
plaintiffs to immediate and irreparable harm.
127
 The court’s order noted 
that, while the state has an interest in criminalizing riot participation, the 
law’s provisions extend past that interest and threaten protected speech and 
the right of association.
128
 The court warned against the laws’ overreaching 
and overbroad power; under the now-overturned framework, these laws 
kept an individual from sending a “supporting email or letter to the editor in 
support of a protest” and giving a “coffee or thumbs up or $10 to 
protesters.”
129
 Judge Piersol put the laws into perspective for the State, 
rhetorically posing the following question: “if these riot boosting statutes 
were applied to the protests that took place in Birmingham, Alabama, what 
might be the result?”
130
 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference would absolutely be liable under these 
laws. One would be hard pressed to find an individual today who would 
come out in support of a conviction of Dr. King under a riot boosting law 
like the one overturned in South Dakota.  
Targeting pipeline protesters is no different. Governor Noem of South 
Dakota has called to shut down “out-of-state people” coming into the state 
to hinder pipeline construction; such a call to action is reminiscent of the 
Birmingham protests, which were criticized for being the work of “outside 
agitators.”
131
 First Amendment violations aside, these calls to action are 
wholly evocative of attempts to delegitimize and minimize Dr. King’s civil 
rights movement as the work of outside actors. The Keystone XL 
opposition movement in South Dakota very closely resembles the Dr. King 
era: a minority group, tired of being ignored and taken advantage of, finally 
takes a stand only to be shut down by the laws and constitutions that 
                                                                                                             
 126. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 22-10-6, 6.1 (2005); S.B. 189, 94th Leg. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (S.D. 2019); Lisa Kaczke, Judge Grants Injunction in ‘Riot Booster’ Lawsuit over 
Possible Keystone XL Protests, ARGUS LEADER (Sept. 18, 2019, 3:14 PM), https://www. 
argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/18/judge-grants-injunction-riot-booster-
lawsuit/1442805001/. 
 127. ACLU Article on Dakota Rural Action v. Noem, supra note 108. 
 128. Kaczke, supra note 126. 
 129. Vera Eidelman, South Dakota Governor Caves on Attempted Efforts to Silence 
Pipeline Protesters, ACLU (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/south-
dakota-governor-caves-on-attempted-efforts-to-silence-pipeline-protesters/?fbclid=IwAR3k-
H3uJApxXS2noKZAm1NuP3ybG1xMOqqbt3pjhhq_ijmLbIF9HqtkQR8. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2020
306 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
 
 
purport to protect it. These groups are equated to “domestic terrorists and 
saboteurs” for fighting against government actions that will substantially, 
and negatively, impact their everyday lives.
132
  
Though South Dakota has complied with the order halting the 
enforcement of these three laws,
133
 nothing is stopping the State from 
crafting a similar law to successfully mute outsiders and keep them from 
fighting for what they feel is right. States are entitled to prohibit speech 
directed at inciting lawless action,
134
 but these three South Dakota laws 
surpass this right by criminalizing “impassioned advocacy that lies at the 
core of our political discourse.”
135
  
B. Texas’ Critical Infrastructure Protection Act 
Texans and the media have criticized Governor Greg Abbott for signing 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act into law.
136
 Passed in June 2019, 
this Act criminalizes trespassing on and loitering near critical infrastructure 
facilities, such as oil and gas pipelines, as well as such facilities that are 
under construction.
137
 The Act charges an offense to anyone who 
intentionally or knowingly damages a facility; additionally, it charges any 
individual who has the intent to damage, destroy, or interrupt a facility 
without evidence that any particularized damage has occurred.
138
 The 
maximum penalty under this Act is a second-degree felony.
139
 Second-
degree felons in Texas face imprisonment of two to twenty years and fines 
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not to exceed $10,000.
140
 Opponents consider this punishment extreme 
given Texas already has sufficient laws in place for criminalizing unlawful 
trespass and damage to land.
141
 
The Texas House of Representatives’ Judiciary & Civil Jurisprudence 
Committee heard testimony for and against the Act before deciding its 
fate.
142
 During a public hearing in March 2019, constituent Alyssa Tharp 
discussed two stories to illustrate her opposition to the bill.
143
 The first 
example focused on the story of a great-grandmother in Texas who, back in 
2012, peacefully protested against the state for acquiring her land to build a 
pipeline.
144
 The individual was arrested and charged with trespassing on the 
land that she rightfully owned before the taking.
145
 Even a harmless, elderly 
great-grandmother peacefully exercising her right to protest would be 
subject to criminal punishment and treated as an enemy to the State of 
Texas under the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act.
146
  
The second illustration offered by Ms. Tharp’s testimony referenced a 
Louisiana critical infrastructure protection law similar to Texas’ Act.
147
 In 
contrast, Louisiana’s law explicitly outlines that actions such as “lawful 
assembly and peaceful and orderly petition” near a pipeline are not subject 
to the criminal provisions.
148
 Though this language seems to provide a 
feasible option for protesters to avoid criminal liability, Ms. Tharp suggests 
the legislation is more of a cautionary tale than admirable lawmaking.
149
 
After this law was passed, numerous individuals protested a pipeline from 
kayaks in open, public water.
150
 Law enforcement fan boats approached the 
protesters, pushing their kayaks onto the easement.
151
 The protesters had 
permission from the landowners to be on the land as the State had not yet 
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acquired full easement entitlements.
152
 Regardless, the protesters were 
arrested and charged with felonies for disruptively protesting too close to 
the facility.
153
 While the Louisiana law’s vague language may not look to 
single out pipeline protesters on its face, the culture surrounding the energy 
industry allows laws like this to result in less-than-civil outcomes. 
Government actions that protect critical infrastructures inherently 
discriminate against protesters by creating a culture of energy-facility 
supremacy. This discriminatory culture gives state governments a big 
brother complex by telling citizens who they should and should not 
associate with.
154
 Further testimony against the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Act identified other Texas laws dealing with vandalism and 
destruction of property.
155
 In support of the Act, even a representative from 
the Texas Pipeline Association contended that this new law would not 
change preexisting state trespass laws during his testimony.
156
 This fact 
leaves opponents wrestling with this question: why waste more government 
resources on a new law with redundant provisions that only serves to single 




The law’s proponents argue Texas merely followed the lead of other 
states trying to keep individuals from exceeding the scope of their First 
Amendment rights.
158
 A number of individuals who testified before the 
Committee in support of the Act focused on the bill’s health and safety 
benefits.
159
 The critical infrastructure industry is primarily concerned with a 
group that refers to itself as “valve turners.”
160
 This group travels to 
pipeline facilities around the country and shuts off pipeline valves,
161
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presumably in an effort to demonstrate its opposition to the growing 
number of energy facilities in the United States. Energy experts contend 
that industry safety procedures require qualified and trained individuals to 
operate pipeline valves; these supporters argue the Texas Act is designed to 




The Act’s proponents fail to recognize that the inherent danger 
surrounding these facilities is part of the reason so many individuals are 
protesting the construction. No one disputes that energy facilities are 
dangerous to the untrained public; rather, rural residents do not want energy 
lines to take oil and gas through their towns, threatening their water supply 
and community safety. These residents likely view an argument for public 
safety in support of the Act as wholly irrelevant and, frankly, quite ironic 
given the inherent risks associated with pipelines.
163
 The law’s opponents 
want legislators and supporters to address the question of silencing 
unpopular speech. The best response to this concern, offered by multiple 
individuals who testified in favor of the legislation, is that the law is not 
trying to limit individual rights and liberties under the Constitution;
164
 
rather, the potential chilling of fundamental rights is an indirect, 
unavoidable consequence resulting from the government’s legitimate 
interest in protecting critical infrastructures.
165
 Notably, it was seldom 
argued that the bill did not chill free speech in practice.
166
 
Many Texans view this Act as a fear tactic employed to dissuade justice 
movements and prevent protests similar to Standing Rock’s.
167
 By 
criminalizing intent to damage facilities without considering whether 
actual, concrete damage was caused, the Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Act allows for extremely liberal prosecution of peaceful protesting. Even 
more frightening is the fact that the law considers intent to interrupt facility 
operations a felony offense. Why would an individual opposing a pipeline 
peacefully protest if not to disrupt facility operations? Very seldom do 
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protests occur in support of the continuation of an act; the definition of the 
word “protest” illustrates an act of objection and a “solemn declaration . . . 
usually of dissent.”
168
 Therefore, while the Texas law purports to 
criminalize acts beyond the protest rights of the First Amendment, a closer 
look reveals that it serves to dissuade peaceful protest as well, leaving 
advocates with no alternative method of voicing pipeline-related concerns. 
It seems that since the Texas Legislature’s friends jumped off the proverbial 
cliff of chilling free speech, it, too, jumped. 
C. The Department of Transportation’s Proposed Legislation 
At the federal level, the Department of Transportation is proposing to 
reauthorize pipeline safety initiatives through the PIPES Act of 2019.
169
 
This bill, which stands for “Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and 
Enhancing Safety,” amends the PIPES Act of 2016; “prioritizes safety, 
promotion, [and] innovation”; and “encourages reliable energy 
infrastructure.”
170
 The DOT’s primary concerns typically focus on safety 
with hazardous materials,
171
 but its most recent proposal prioritizes 
deterring the public from interacting with energy facilities that could cause 
serious harm.
172
 The PIPES Act of 2016 covers knowing and willful 
damage and destruction to, or an attempt or conspiracy to damage or 
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ents/Testimony-Elliott.pdf (statement of Howard “Skip” Elliot, Administrator, Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Department of Transportation); see also Press 
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destroy, interstate and intrastate pipelines.
173
 The 2019 DOT proposal 
would amend the existing PIPES Act to criminalize “damaging, destroying, 
vandalizing, tampering with, impeding the operation of, disrupting . . . or 
inhibiting the operation of” pipelines.
174
 Similar to Texas’ Critical 
Infrastructure Protection Act,
175
 the DOT bill would protect facilities both 
in operation and under construction.
176
 The PIPES Act of 2019 is currently 




Though DOT representatives assure the legislation is not meant to deter 
lawful protests under the First Amendment,
178
 opponents of the proposal 
beg to differ. Representative Frank Pallone, Chairman of the U.S. House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, argues the bill will be “used as a 
vehicle for stifling legitimate dissent and protest.”
179
 Pallone expects the 
provision will not make it past the committee.
180
 Other opponents to the 
proposal find the bill to be in direct conflict with the constitutional right to 
peacefully assemble.
181
 The DOT proposal is a blatant intimidation tactic 
against those who are passionate about keeping water, communities, and the 
climate clean. Just like Texas’ new law, the DOT bill attempts to draw eyes 
away from the chilling of free speech and toward the need to protect the 
energy agenda. 
IV. Ebbs and Flows of First Amendment Restrictions 
The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to express his or her 
ideas free from interference. The Amendment reads as follows: “Congress 
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances.”
182
 The First Amendment was 
adopted as a safeguard against any basic civil rights restrictions from 
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governments and private individuals alike;
183
 the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause extends these protections to apply against state 
governments as well.
184
 Former Supreme Court Justice William Douglas 
described the restriction of First Amendment rights as “the most dangerous 
of all subversions . . . the one un-American act that could most easily defeat 
us.”
185
 But the First Amendment’s protections are not absolute, as case law 
is continuously redefining the scope of permissible conduct under the 
Constitution.  
Inherent in the First Amendment’s free speech and peaceable assembly 
provisions is the right to protest.
186
 The government is entitled to restrict 
speech and assembly only if the restriction is both narrowly tailored in 
furtherance of a compelling government interest and the least restrictive 
means of achieving that interest.
187
 Additionally, speech can be regulated if 
it is directed at inciting imminent lawless action.
188
 But First Amendment 
restrictions cannot be content-based or lack neutrality based on ideas or 
subject matter;
189
 restrictions distinguishing between types of speech are 
overbroad and patently unconstitutional.
190
 The anti-protest laws of South 
Dakota and Texas, as well as the DOT proposal, are unconstitutional 
because they restrict an individual’s right to peaceably assemble in addition 
to the subject matter of speech. For example, Texas’ new law is content-
based because it bans assembly where the content of the speech surrounds 
critical infrastructure facilities.
191
 And South Dakota’s failure to clearly 
define protest boosting places a blanket ban on all speech of a certain topic 
and leaves no alternative means of communicating information.
192
 This 
discussion introduces examples of both restricted and unrestricted conduct 
to illustrate the unconstitutionality of anti-protest legislation. In addition, 
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this analysis demonstrates that the precedent presented is unworkable, 
outdated, and inapplicable to free speech and assembly claims today. 
This section additionally discusses the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
of Religion Clause with a focus on tribal opposition to pipelines. 
Notwithstanding a finding of these state and federal laws as constitutional, 
prohibiting tribal worship is unconstitutionally coercive and restricts the 
religious free exercise of Native American communities. While the 
government is entitled to force compliance with criminal laws, it cannot 
impede the observance of a religion
193
 nor coerce an individual into 
violating his religious beliefs.
194
 For most tribal peoples, such obstruction 
and coercion occurs when communities are unable to worship and 
acknowledge the existence of sacred sites. Preventing these individuals 
from protesting against the destruction of their sacred sites goes hand-in-
hand with preventing the free practice and exercise of their religion. This 
portion of the First Amendment discussion introduces examples of 
constitutional and unconstitutional restrictions on religious free exercise to 
demonstrate the massive imposition placed on tribes by anti-protest 
legislation. These principles are further illustrated by a brief history of free 
religious exercise disputes by tribes against the United States government. 
A. Constitutional Restrictions on Free Speech and Assembly 
Speech can be regulated if it is directed at inducing, and likely to 
produce, imminent lawless action. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, a state statute 
criminalized the act of advocating for “crime, sabotage, violence, or 
unlawful methods of terrorism” and the assembly of any group formed for 
the purpose of teaching such doctrines of criminal syndicalism.
195
 Though 
the appellant—convicted for inviting another individual to a Ku Klux Klan 
rally—ultimately prevailed, the Supreme Court held that a state can forbid 
“advocacy of the use of force or of law violation” where such speech or 
assembly is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and 
is likely to incite or produce such action.”
196
  
The government is entitled to enforce time, place, and manner 
regulations on speech and assemblies. The respondents in Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism disputed a New York City regulation requiring Central Park 
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performers to use the city’s sound equipment and technicians.
197
 In deciding 
for the city, the Supreme Court set forth a three-pronged test for 
determining the constitutionality of a time, place, and manner restriction; 
such restrictions must be (1) applied neutrally and without reference to the 
content of the speech, (2) narrowly tailored to a significant government 
purpose, and (3) open enough to allow for alternative communication of the 
ideas.
198
 The respondents argued the regulation was content-based, as the 
city’s concern for sound quality sought to impose “artistic control over 
performers at the bandshell by enforcing a bureaucratically determined, 
value-laden conception of good sound.”
199
 The Court declined this 
argument, finding the restriction to be merely esthetic.
200
 
Finally, a state is entitled to criminalize the public uttering of fighting 
words. The appellant in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire was arrested for 
calling the complainant a “God damned racketeer” and a “damned Fascist” 
as well as stating that the entire government was filled with “Fascists or 
agents of Fascists.”
201
 The statute in question states no person is allowed to 
address another in a manner that is “offensive, derisive or annoying,” call 
that person by any offensive name, nor make noise in that person’s 
presence with the intent of offending or preventing him from “pursuing his 
lawful business or occupation.”
202
 Because the statute was narrowly drawn 




American public opinion is constantly evolving, and modern ideas 
demand Supreme Court decisions that are workable, applicable, and 
reflective of the world today. Administering outdated reasoning to present-
day problems effectively discredits the issues of all appellants. Anti-protest 
statutes allow states to silence tribal and American voices against blatant 
wrongs and, since these cases are still good law, courts will look to their 
unworkable holdings when considering both the Sioux Tribe’s claims 
against the Army Corps and general claims against anti-protest legislation. 
Unless the outdated precedent created by these cases is overruled, anti-
protest legislation will survive scrutiny and tribal interests will continue to 
be put on the backburner.  
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Under the framework in Brandenburg, the imminent lawless action case, 
one could argue that tribal and public opposition to a federal project, such 
as a pipeline, is classified as terrorism or sabotage. Brandenburg entitles 
states to enact statutes criminalizing “advocacy of the use of force or of law 
violation” and assembly “directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action”
204
 near or regarding pipeline facilities. With laws such as 
Texas’ Critical Infrastructure Protection Act
205
 in place, intending to 
interfere with a pipeline’s operations is the precise lawless action the 
Brandenburg mentality criminalizes. This outcome leaves tribes hopeless to 
defend their sacred sites unless they can successfully convince their state 
and local governments not to succumb to the influence of big oil. Every 
opposition movement is different, but Texas’ ban on all pipeline 
interferences unconstitutionally imposes on the fundamental right to protest 
regardless of how peaceful the opposition is.  
In Ward, the city’s subjective regulation on the basis of mere sound 
quality was upheld. This decision allows states to pass laws such as those of 
Texas and South Dakota that are theoretically neutral but, in practice, 
obviously prohibit a certain speech or assembly from occurring. Applying 
the three-pronged Ward test to the anti-protest laws demonstrates the 
unconstitutionality of the restrictions. As a reminder, Ward established that 
a time, place, and manner restriction must be (1) applied neutrally, without 
reference to the speech’s context, (2) narrowly tailored to a significant 
government purpose, and (3) open, allowing for alternative communication 
of the ideas proffered.
206
 First, arising anti-protest restrictions are not 
content-neutral as they could not possibly be aimed at deterring speech 
other than that opposing pipelines and energy projects. Even assuming that 
there is a significant government interest in restricting speech surrounding 
critical infrastructure facilities, these restrictions still are not narrowly 
drawn, nor do they punish specific conduct. South Dakota’s failure to 
define what it means to “boost” a riot
207
 supports the anti-protest laws’ 
failure to meet the second Ward prong. The laws’ ambiguous language also 
leads the legislation to fail the third prong of the Ward test: failing to define 
the means by which the law can be violated affords opponents no 
opportunity to communicate their ideas through alternate channels. Cryptic 
language intimidates protesters and discourages them from voicing their 
opinions entirely out of fear of prosecution. 
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Texas and South Dakota passed their respective anti-protest laws because 
of the influential opinions of large oil and gas companies. The Chaplinsky 
legacy affirms this restriction of free speech just because popular opinion 
deems it to be bothersome. Chaplinsky affords states the opportunity to 
quash the opinions of tribes in the name of derisive and annoying speech by 
passing legislation at the influence of energy corporations. The fact that 
Chaplinsky was heard in 1942 is particularly relevant to the holding’s 
applicability today. Calling someone a “fascist” in the midst of the World 
Wars and Mussolini’s reign over Italy is arguably more damning than doing 
so one hundred years after the Fascist Party was founded.
208
 This 
characteristic is not unique to Chaplinsky. In 1925, the Supreme Court 
upheld an individual’s conviction for distributing a left-wing socialist 
manifesto in Gitlow v. New York. The statute in Gitlow criminalized 




Analyzing the breadth of a state’s ability to restrict conduct commands 
us to consider the history surrounding these cases.
210
 We must question 
whether the speech and assembly interests of Americans should be 
subjected to judicial decisions that happened in a time where words deemed 
offensive, derisive, or annoying are completely different under a modern 
lens. If you were called a “God damned racketeer” today, would you do 
more than furrow your brow in confusion and walk away? Anti-protest 
legislation seeks protection under these First Amendment cases that allow 
for subjective determinations of popular conduct and acceptable sound 
quality. Surely, we would not still apply the Gitlow statute, considering 
support for socialism to be an attempt to overthrow the government, today. 
If so, maybe someone should warn Senator Bernie Sanders, Representative 
Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and the reported 50,000 members of the 
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B. Bars to Restricting Free Speech and Assembly 
Advocating for a moral need to resort to force is different from 
“preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action.”
212
 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, the criminal syndicalism case, illustrates instances in 
which a state is powerless to encroach on First Amendment rights.
213
 In this 
case, a state statute criminalizing the advocacy of sabotage and terrorism 
was struck down because it failed to draw a distinction between mere 
advocacy and imminent lawless action.
214
 Much to the chagrin of many 
Americans, the Brandenburg Court was committed to protecting pure 
speech regardless of how unpopular it was. Congress enacted the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 just five years before the Brandenburg decision, 
guaranteeing all Americans the equal enjoyment of public accommodations 
“without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, 
religion, or national origin.”
215
 Brandenburg demonstrates that racist, 
outrageous, and offensive speech can be afforded great protection under the 
First Amendment—even in the midst of a national civil rights movement.  
Distinguishing between different types of speech and assembly is 
patently unconstitutional and violative of principles of equal protection. In 
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, the respondent challenged a city 
ordinance which provided a labor exemption to its ordinance banning 
picketing within a certain distance from a school.
216
 The city’s exemption 
was struck down because the ordinance unconstitutionally affected 
picketing, a form of expressive conduct, “by classifications formulated in 
terms of the subject of the picketing.”
217
 The Constitution grants the 
government “no power to restrict expression because of its message, its 
ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”
218
 Therefore, permitting one type of 
protest over the other is overbroad and presumptively unconstitutional.
219
 
Speech on matters of public concern “is at the heart of the First 
Amendment’s protection” regardless of how despicable the public finds the 
conduct to be.
220
 In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court reaffirmed the Brandenburg 
principles and upheld the offensive speech of picketers protesting a military 
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 Individuals congregated outside the service to 
communicate their belief that “God hates the United States for its tolerance 
of homosexuality, particularly in America’s military.”
222
 The picketers 
chanted statements such as “Thank God for 9/11,” “Thank God for Dead 
Soldiers,” and a variety of pejorative stereotypes aimed at homosexuals.
223
 
Supporting the 9/11 attacks is terrorism and sabotage against the United 
States, but because the picketers’ signs concerned “broad issues of interest 
to society at large,” the speech was constitutional.
224
 The Bill of Rights 
reflects a “profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”
225
 Further, 
speech concerning public affairs is “the essence of self-government.”
226
 
Each of these cases formulates a singular defense for those opposing 
anti-protest legislation: public speech, no matter how offensive or 
outrageous, is always afforded protection under the First Amendment. 
South Dakota’s blanket ban on all riot support is unconstitutional under the 
Brandenburg lens; criminalizing mere support of pipeline protests—
whether direct, through participation, or indirect, by showing approval via 
social media—fails to distinguish between mere advocacy and an actual, 
likely incitement to lawless action. Texas’ new law is less suspicious, as its 
outlined violations are clearer than South Dakota’s. But it still fails under 
Brandenburg as its restrictions are content-based and leave no alternative 
channels for communication.  
Texas’ law stands in direct contrast to the holding in Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley. Here, the problem with the law in Texas is that the 
outlined restrictions are too specific. Restrictions made by a classification 
or distinction based on the subject matter of speech are clearly violative of 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
227
 Specifically 
banning anti-critical infrastructure speech and assembly gives Texas the 
authority to “restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject 
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Federal energy projects are some of the most pressing issues of public 
concern; therefore, speech surrounding critical infrastructure facilities 
should be awarded blanket protection under the First Amendment. Speech 
is of public concern if it relates to political or social community matters and 
is “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public.”
229
 
Pipeline construction under a community’s water source and through areas 
of cultural and religious significance is a social community matter; the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe has standing to oppose the Dakota Access 
Pipeline on this element alone. The immense national support for the 
movement against the Dakota Access Pipeline further evidences the public 
value and interest surrounding the issue of construction. The Standing Rock 
case does not dispute whether a significant government interest exists; 
maintenance of public and private property, peaceful protesting, and 
successful energy projects are legitimate concerns worthy of preventive 
legislation. But the actions taken against anti-pipeline movements are 
wholly coercive, overly restrictive, and lacking in content-neutral 
application. Supporting the government and supporting the protesters are 
not mutually exclusive; Americans can contend that a legitimate 
government interest behind maintaining the protests exists while still 
identifying the responses to the Standing Rock movement as overly 
restrictive. 
C. Where the Government Can and Cannot Restrict the Free Exercise of 
Religion 
The government is not required to conduct its affairs in a manner which 
aids a citizen in carrying out his or her religious beliefs. In Bowen v. Roy, 
two individuals receiving state welfare benefits refused to comply with a 
requirement that beneficiaries provide the social security numbers of each 
member receiving the benefits.
230
 The individuals felt that obtaining a social 
security number for their daughter “would violate their Native American 
religious beliefs.”
231
 The parents, members of the Abenaki Tribe, believe 
“control over one’s life is essential to spiritual purity and indispensable to 
‘becoming a holy person’”;
232
 obtaining a social security number—a 
number over which they had no control—would rob their daughter of her 
ability to keep her person and spirit unique and “prevent her from attaining 
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 The social security requirement was found to be 
“wholly neutral in religious terms and uniformly applicable” 
notwithstanding the family’s religious free exercise claims.
234
  
The Free Exercise of Religion Clause “does not relieve an individual of 
the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids . . . the 
performance of an act that his religious belief requires” so long as the law is 
neutral to religion “and is otherwise constitutional as applied to those who 
engage in the specified act for nonreligious reasons.”
235
 The respondents in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 
were fired for ingesting peyote, a hallucinogen banned by state law, for 
religious purposes as members of the Native American Church.
236
 The 
government was entitled to deny unemployment benefits to the respondents 
because they were discharged for the use of illicit drugs, even though the 
use of those drugs was sacramental.
237
 Allowing a religious exception to a 
law “would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious 
exemptions from civil obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”
238
 
As for the bars to restricting religious free exercise, a law impeding the 
observance of a religion and discriminating between religions is 
significantly burdensome and invalid. In Sherbert v. Verner, the appellant 
was denied unemployment benefits after she was fired for refusing to work 
on Saturdays.
239
 The appellant was a practicing Seventh-day Adventist, and 
Saturdays are the faith’s Sabbath days.
240
 The appellant’s employer viewed 
her refusal to work on Saturdays as her failing to accept suitable work 
without good cause.
241
 Finding for the appellant, the Court held the Free 
Exercise Clause prohibits a state from applying the eligibility requirements 
of an unemployment compensation statute where the provisions prevent an 
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individual from properly observing the key principles of her religion.
242
 No 
compelling state interest supports the subjective good cause requirement 
when it substantially infringes on an individual’s constitutional rights.
243
 
Individual religious interests outweigh state interests when a state is 
attempting to coerce a violation of religious beliefs. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
Amish respondents successfully challenged the state’s compulsory school 
attendance law requiring children to attend school until the age of 
sixteen.
244
 The respondents declined to send their children to school after 
the eighth grade, setting forth evidence of “the adequacy of [the Amish] 
alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education” to prepare 
children for life in the Amish community.
245
 The respondents further 
believed that high school attendance was sincerely “contrary to the Amish 
religion.”
246
 Ultimately, the Court found the state could not compel the 
respondents’ children to attend school because the Free Exercise Clause 




Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to prevent 
government actors from “substantially burdening” religious free exercise, 
even if the burden is the result of a generally applicable rule.
248
 The Act 
follows that the government is only entitled to burden an individual’s 
exercise of religion if the restriction is (1) in place to further a compelling 




Knowingly destroying tribal sites of religious and cultural significance 
impedes upon the tribes’ ability to exercise their religions freely. The Mentz 
Declaration illustrates such blatant and intentional destruction of sacred 
sites by the government.
250
 Not only does the Sherbert decision afford 
Sioux Tribe members the right to protest the Dakota Access Pipeline’s 
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construction, but it invalidates any anti-protest legislation preventing such 
tribal advocacy. Preventing these tribes from observing the key principles 
of their religion unconstitutionally coerces them into violating their 
religious beliefs. Native individuals are forced to ignore the fact that the 
government is blatantly destroying key facets of their religious practices. 
But Sherbert gives tribal members a framework with which they can defend 
sacred sites as central to their religious observances; any restriction 
imposing upon the tribes’ religious observances is significantly burdensome 
and invalid. 
Avoiding the destruction of a religion does not constitute a government 
establishment of religion. In Smith, the peyote case, the Court was 
concerned with the slippery slope of providing a religious exemption.
251
 
Yoder remedies this concern. In Yoder, the government demonstrated 
respect for the unconventional beliefs of the Amish religion to exempt the 
respondents from following the compulsory school attendance law.
252
 The 
Yoder Court recognized that requiring the Amish respondents to comply 
with the law unconstitutionally coerced the individuals into violating their 
religious beliefs while holding that any exemption was not an establishment 
of the Amish religion.
253
  
The Army Corps fails to recognize that it can avoid the desecration of 
sacred sites without establishing or even supporting the Sioux Tribe’s 
religion. By choosing to work around these sites of religious and cultural 
significance, the Army Corps has the opportunity to show its respect for the 
Standing Rock Tribe’s religion and avoid conflict altogether. By forcing the 
Tribe to give up sacred and burial sites inherent to its religion, the 
government is endorsing a coercion of the Sioux Tribe to violate its 
religious beliefs.  
D. A Tribal History of Unsuccessful Religious Free Exercise Claims  
A sacred place is not a symbol of religion, nor is it a place to remember 
the people and events of the past; on its own, a sacred place is “the source 
of sacred power.”
254
 Indigenous people have “an understanding of the 
relatedness, or affiliation, of the human and nonhuman worlds,” giving rise 
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to a central concept of respect for the “inherent value belonging to the 
natural world.”
255
 Notwithstanding their religious and spiritual significance, 
sacred sites contribute to a tribe’s political and economic survival by 
ceremonially “restoring the community’s balance with the natural 
world.”
256
 Analyzing the history of tribal Free Exercise claims demands 
recognition of the value of indigenous sacred sites. Historically, however, 
courts have failed to recognize the importance of these sites, often giving 
great deference to the federal government. 
A tribe’s characterization of land as “sacred” demonstrates mere personal 
preference and not a “conviction[] shared by the entire organized group.”
257
 
In Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority, various Cherokee Indian 
plaintiffs sought to prevent a government dam project which would result in 
“irreversible loss to the culture and history” of the tribes; specifically, the 
reservoir would flood and ruin generations of graves and sacred sites.
258
 
During the trial, Cherokee elder Richard Crowe spoke of the affected land 
as one of the Tribe’s most sacred places; to Crowe’s family, the land was 
the birthplace of the Cherokee tradition and the group’s one true 
“connection with the Great Spirit.”
259
 Despite Crowe’s testimony, and the 
sacred religious sites’ impending submersion as a result of the reservoir, the 
Sixth Circuit approved the dam’s construction and found the land was not 
indispensable nor sufficiently central to the Tribe’s religious 
observances.
260
 Though culture, history, and tradition are vital to many 
individuals, the Sixth Circuit did not afford these interests protection under 
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise provision.
261
  
Sequoyah’s centrality and indispensability standard was reaffirmed in 
Wilson v. Block just three years later.
262
 In Wilson, various Hopi and Navajo 
Tribe members sought to enjoin U.S. Forest Service operations aimed at 
developing downhill skiing facilities.
263
 The Wilson plaintiffs claimed that 
the Sequoyah decision did not properly interpret the Constitution, as “the 
First Amendment protects all practices” regardless of their centrality to the 
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 But the D.C. Circuit in Wilson held that the Sequoyah 
analysis “focuses inquiry solely upon the importance of the geographic site 
in question to the practice of the plaintiffs’ religion” and not on the alleged 
“theological importance of the disputed activity.”
265
 The American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act only “requires [that] federal agencies . . . avoid 
unnecessary interference with . . . traditional Indian religious practices.”
266
 
Since the skiing developments did not deny the tribes access to the land, the 
government’s projects did not violate the First Amendment.
267
  
Finally, as long as the government’s actions do not constitute an attempt 
to coerce individuals into violating their religious beliefs, those actions that 
have severe adverse effects on tribal religious practices are constitutionally 
permissible. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, three 
tribes sought to enjoin federal timber harvesting and road construction in an 
area historically utilized for religious purposes.
268
 The government 
contended, and the Supreme Court agreed, that the projects would have 
“devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices.”
269
 But 
whatever that “exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on the free 
exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct [of the] government” may 
be, “the location of the line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a 
governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.”
270
 
The United States “simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy 
every citizen’s religious needs and desires,” placing final affirmation on the 
government’s knowing destruction of tribal religious sites.
271
 In his dissent, 
Justice Brennan described the Lyng decision as one that has “effectively 
bestowed on one party,” meaning the federal government, “the unilateral 
authority to resolve all future disputes in its favor, subject only to the 
Court’s toothless exhortation to be ‘sensitive’ to affected religions.”
272
 In 
Brennan’s opinion, “Native Americans deserve—and the Constitution 
demands—more than this.”
273 
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The preceding cases illustrate that the Supreme Court is unlikely to 
protect a sacred site on the grounds of religious freedom. There are strong 
arguments that a site’s classification as “sacred” deems it to be central or 
indispensable to the religion, and destroying any of these sites coerces a 
tribe into violating its beliefs by taking away its ability to practice in the 
area. But courts—particularly the Lyng Court—focus on the tribes’ right to 
the land in determining whether they can even allege an injury against the 
government. Perhaps Standing Rock supporters are wrong to assert the First 
Amendment in the name of tribal justice;
274
 the Lyng Court held the dispute 
primarily concerned property law rather than religious freedom.
275
 Recall 
that the Dakota Access Pipeline will run through the Sioux Tribe’s water 
source just a mile north of the reservation’s border, but it will not actually 
cross the threshold to enter the Tribe’s land. Does lack of land ownership 
mean the Standing Rock case is dead in the water? 
V. Property Law and Cultural Conceptions of Ownership Rights 
When the government owns tribal sacred sites, there exists an “obvious 
tension between Indian religious preferences and federal land ownership 
interests.”
276
 The issue of land ownership is closely bound to religious free 
exercise when a tribe is trying to stake a claim to land. Absent federal 
validation of the land’s centrality to a religion, tribes cannot establish the 
requisite land ownership—whether literal or constructive.
277
 Courts struggle 
with the fact that granting land ownership to a tribe entitles property rights 
to federally owned land. This struggle is rooted in the history of American 
jurisprudence, with the Johnson v. M’Intosh decision setting precedent for 
such questions today.  
A. Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Doctrine of Discovery 
In 1775, Thomas Johnson purchased land from members of the 
Piankeshaw Indian Tribe and left the land to his heirs upon his death.
278
 
Absent knowledge of this conveyance, the federal government sold 11,560 
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acres of this land to William M’Intosh in 1818.
279
 Both Johnson’s heirs and 
M’Intosh claimed a legal right to the land.
280
 The Court found for M’Intosh, 
as the Piankeshaw Indians had “no right of soil as sovereign, independent 
states” and, therefore, no right to sell the land to Johnson in the first 
place.
281
 The Doctrine of Discovery governed the outcome in this case.
282
 
The Doctrine of Discovery theorizes that European or Christian nations that 
discover new lands automatically gain sovereign and property rights 
notwithstanding existing native ownership, occupation, and use of the 
land.
283
 The notion entitles transfer of native rights over the land—political, 
commercial, and property—to this European or Christian discoverer.
284
 The 
discoverer gains “sovereign governmental rights over the native peoples 
and their governments . . . without the knowledge or the consent of the 
Indian people.”
285
 So, since European or Christian discovery of land gives 
title to the government of the subjects who made the discovery, M’Intosh’s 
claim to the land was superior.
286
  
Though the brunt of this decision fell on Johnson’s heirs, the true 
injustice lies in the fact that tribal land ownership—established by hundreds 
of years of living and practicing on the land—was trumped by new 
American “discovery.” The Johnson Court did not consider how long the 
Piankeshaw Indians lived on the land before this discovery; since the Tribe 
failed to commercially exploit the land before the land’s discovery, the land 
ownership could be stripped and given to an entirely new owner.
287
  
The Doctrine of Discovery “redefined indigenous land as an object to be 
conquered and exploited,” not preserved or maintained for future 
generations.
288
 This principle conflicts with the basic tribal motivation for 
preserving land: maintaining “spiritual connections to . . . ancestors.”
289
 A 
significant site’s mere existence perpetuates such a connection, even absent 
an ability to access the site.
290
 The spiritual connection is lost when a site is 
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destroyed—either literally, through action, or constructively, through a loss 
of title to the land.
291
  
The Johnson Court ignored this motivation, characterizing Native 
Americans as non-Christian “heathens.”
292
 The added consideration of an 
individual’s Christianity “further explains the refusal of federal courts today 
to protect or preserve lands that contain the sacred sites or burials of 
individuals who do not practice Christianity.”
293
 The Johnson decision is 
primarily to blame for this judicial culture; Johnson created a legal 
framework that entitles absolute conquest powers and blanket immunity to 
the government at the expense of Native Americans.  
American legal institutions “cannot escape from Western notions of 
property even when the Court believes those notions produce unjust 
results.”
294
 Chief Justice Marshall found the Doctrine of Discovery’s 
application in Johnson to be “unavoidable” considering the structure and 
attitude of the Western legal tradition.
295
 “Created to implement Anglo-
American laws,” the American court system made it difficult for Marshall 
to find for the Piankeshaw Indians.
296
 Experts suggest we should sleep 
soundly knowing that Marshall likely disagreed with the decision
297
 and 
surely would not have wished the effect of Johnson on tribes today.  
Dissenting opinions often shape future authority. The Standing Rock 
case presents a unique opportunity to oppose the Johnson framework, as the 
holding remains binding precedent. The Plessy v. Ferguson
298
 dissent 
“transformed into the foundational authority for the majority opinion in 
Brown v. Board of Education.”
299
 Similarly, the Bowers v. Hardwick
300
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dissent influenced the Court to strike down sodomy laws altogether in 
Lawrence v. Texas
301
 almost twenty years later.
302
 Every instance of 
dissent—art, litigation, free speech in public forums—effectively changes 
laws that a given majority has enacted.
303
 A ruling for Standing Rock will 
force the government to acknowledge a tribal right to land used for 
religious purposes. Such a holding might be the dissent needed to overturn 
Johnson for good. In addition, overruling Johnson could possibly overturn 
the tribal religious freedom cases discussed previously. If this were to 
happen, it would not matter to courts whether a religious practice was 
sufficiently central or indispensable to the religion; the mere existence of a 
religious practice on a given piece of land would bar the government from 
touching the property in any way that would interfere with the practice. “If 
George Washington founded the country, John Marshall defined it”;
304
 can 
Standing Rock redefine American property rights? 
B. The Western Conception of Property and the Lyng Ownership Bar 
Lyng held that government actions imposing severe adverse effects on a 
tribe’s religious practices are constitutional as long as the actions do not 
attempt to coerce the tribe members into violating their religious beliefs.
305
 
Notwithstanding the “devastating effects [of government actions] on 
traditional Indian religious practices,” the government “simply could not 
operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen’s religious needs and 
desires.”
306
 Experts predicted that Lyng “would effectively eliminate the 
possibility of using the First Amendment to challenge agency decisions 
regarding the management of sacred sites,” resulting in “a serious blow to 
the protection of Indian sacred sites.”
307
  
Lyng supporters propose an idea known as “the tragedy of the 
anticommons” as a counterargument to the negative effects of the 
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 The concept of the tragedy of the anticommons stands in 
contrast to the well-known logic of the tragedy of the commons, whereby 
the “overexploitation of resources and over-production of pollution” occurs 
“as each individual pursues her self-interest.”
309
 Conversely, the tragedy of 
the anticommons illustrates that, with “too many owners holding rights of 
exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse.”
310
 In Lyng, the tribes were 
able to use the disputed land, but could not exclude others from accessing 
the areas considered sacred.
311
 Supporters argue the Lyng holding was 
correct because the tribal desire to block all development in the future 
would lead to a rarely optimal, perpetual non-use of the property.
312
 This 
result—the tragedy of the anticommons—is remedied by eliminating 
“overlapping property rights that create the power to veto potential uses of 
the land.”
313
 The Court exercised this veto power in denying the Lyng tribes 
exclusive access to the land. 
American courts fail to understand the differences between American 
and Native American conceptions of property and religion, giving rise to 
outcomes such as the restrictive Lyng exclusionary power. The Anglo-
American conception of property rests on an ownership model of 
property
314
 whereby “property rights identify a private owner who has title 
to a set of valued resources with a presumption of full power over those 
resources.”
315
 These property powers include the right to transfer, use, 
exclude from, destroy, consume, and possess property. In contrast, Indians 
view property “as utterly incapable of reduction to ownership as property 
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 The tribes in sacred sites cases only seek partial rights 
to the land—not full ownership; rather than take the land from the 
government, tribes merely wish to access the land and prevent its 
destruction. Federal courts apply Anglo-centric blanket bans on land use 
and ownership in sacred sites cases without considering native peoples’ 
desires and the manner in which they view property ownership.  
Tribes such as the Lyng plaintiffs are simply asking the federal 
government to “manage its property in a way that would protect the 
‘privacy and solitude’ necessary for Indian religious practices.”
317
 This 
request introduces the second distinction American courts fail to make: the 
differences between Native and Judeo-Christian religions.
318
 Failure to 
consider this distinction further bars tribes from making free exercise 
claims in defense of their sacred sites.
319
 This obstacle is known as the Lyng 
ownership bar.
320
 Judeo-Christian religions, such as Judaism and 
Christianity, recognize specific places as having deep religious significance, 
but those Judeo-Christian individuals are assumed to be able to practice 
their religions anywhere.
321
 Native religions are often “inextricably tied to 
particular places in the natural world and cannot be relocated” in contrast to 
Judeo-Christian religions.
322
 Tribal religious practitioners have strong 
relationships to land deemed “essential to [both the] religion and [the 
tribe’s] culture.”
323
 Yet tribes are barred from establishing any type of 




American jurisprudence incorrectly assumes that Western law and 
society operate through the ownership model of property. Sacred sites cases 
focus on the distinguished rights of owners (the federal government) and 
non-owners (native peoples). In reality, owners are bound by moral and 
legal obligations which restrict their rights and afford rights to non-
owners.
325
 Landlords retain the right to take back property upon the 
                                                                                                             
 316. Id. (quoting William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts”: 
Reparations, Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 1, 27 (2002-2003)). 
 317. Carpenter, supra note 314, at 626. 
 318. See id. at 623. 
 319. See id. at 625. 
 320. See id. 
 321. Id. at 623. 
 322. Id. at 624. 
 323. Id. at 625. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. at 627. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss2/4
No. 2] COMMENTS 331 
 
 
conclusion of a lease while tenants are entitled to an implied right of 
habitability, the ability to receive visitors, and security from eviction during 
the lease.
326
 Similarly, business owners can exclude patrons but are limited 
by federal discrimination laws.
327
 And copyright owners exercise exclusive 
rights for limited amounts of time, allowing for non-owners of property to 
participate in the free exchange of copyright ideas.
328
 On a basic level, 
property law has afforded non-owners land rights since time immemorial; 
easements, covenants, and adverse possession all entitle non-owners a stake 
in a piece of land. This more realistic conception of the American property 
model considers “the conflicting interests of everyone with legitimate 
claims to rights in the property in question.”
329
 Property rules structure 
social relationships “by setting expectations, imposing obligations, and 
affecting power distribution,”
330
 demonstrating that owners’ property rights 
are neither exclusive nor absolute. Analyzing a property right “depends on 
the way in which it shapes relationships . . . and expresses human 
values.”
331
 Sacred sites cases should protect principles of equity and intent 
in the same way other areas of property law—such as wills and trusts—do. 
Since ownership is only one component of a property rights analysis, the 
same should be true in Indian sacred sites cases.
332
 
Lyng is a cautionary tale to the Standing Rock movement; absent strong 
advocacy in favor of the property rights of non-owners, there is no end to 
the government’s exclusionary veto power. Just as tenants, consumers, and 
copyright owner-hopefuls retain non-owner rights to property, native tribes 
are entitled to limited ownership of sacred sites on federal land. Johnson 
and Lyng may give the government the right to desecrate tribal religions, 
but it is not by any means required to exercise this right.
333
 A favorable 
outcome in Standing Rock will keep the government from doing so. 
VI. Conclusion  
The wrongs at Standing Rock present a unique opportunity to oppose a 
discriminatory culture of conquest in America. For decades, tribes have 
faced innumerable civil rights injustices dating back to the original 
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American discovery of native lands and sacred sites. Now, anti-protest 
legislation stands in the way of advocating for tribal rights.  
The first step toward establishing tribal non-ownership rights to sacred 
sites is to advocate for the reform of anti-protest legislation. Anti-protest 
laws are unconstitutional because they prevent individuals from exercising 
their rights to free speech, assembly, and religious exercise. These laws 
facially discriminate against certain types of speech and assembly, vaguely 
banning all advocacy of a given idea. The First Amendment precedent 
guiding these laws is outdated, unworkable, and mostly applicable to an era 
where allegations of fascism and socialism were insults rather than fact. 
The Standing Rock protesters are not terrorists, nor saboteurs, for opposing 
pipeline construction; these protesters are advocates for the health and 
safety of the Standing Rock community, water supply, and irreplaceable 
cultural sites.  
The Johnson v. M’Intosh decision supports the American conquest 
mentality that encourages tribal disrespect in the Standing Rock case. 
Johnson entitles the government to entirely ignore the Sioux Tribe’s 
existence in furtherance of the energy industries’ interests. Alongside Lyng, 
Johnson kills a non-owner property claim before it even starts, favoring 
American and Judeo-Christian entitlements over all others. This precedent 
has not yet been successfully challenged. Standing Rock can serve as this 
vehicle. 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe members are non-owners of their sacred sites 
in the path of pipeline construction. Similar to tenants, copyright 
participants, and adverse possessors, tribal members are afforded non-
owner rights to the use of property that is not theirs to own. The property 
rights of fee simple owners are not absolute, especially within the Native 
American conception of property law. The Standing Rock crisis gives tribes 
the chance to challenge the discriminatory Johnson framework to prevent 
similar wrongs in the future. Fortunately, national support surrounding the 
crisis at Standing Rock suggests that most Americans are encouraging 
tribes to do so.  
While, sometimes, the government is entitled to trump tribal interests, it 
is never required to do so. Philosopher John Locke summarized early 
notions of property and possessions with the following statement: “Thus in 
the beginning all the World was America.”
334
 Perhaps Locke was right. But 
the world does not have to stay that way. 
                                                                                                             
 334. LOCKE, supra note 1.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss2/4
